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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
For this installment of the Recent Developments, we have chosen
to highlight a variety of federal and state cases as well as two new
statutes enacted in 2004 by the Florida Legislature.1 In the first case
we cover, Missouri v. Seibert,2 the United States Supreme Court refined the scope of Miranda3 and may have mandated new interrogation procedures for police departments. Our coverage of the Florida

1. Chris Hamilton, Seam Park, Shane Ramsey, Ty Roofner, and Jessica Slatten contributed to the Recent Developments. Thanks are in order to Professor B.J. Priester for his
assistance with this project, and we owe our continuing gratitude to Professor Charles
Ehrhardt for his continued advice and wisdom regarding the Recent Developments.
2. 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Supreme Court begins with Warner v. City of Boca Raton,4 where the
court affirmed that the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act
prevents neutral, generally applicable laws from infringing upon religious practices. This decision likely invites a substantial amount of
future litigation, as general laws are challenged as alleged religious
infringements. Next, Taylor v. School Board of Brevard County5 addresses the unrelated works exception to the workers compensation
statute; although the court ultimately concluded that the “unrelated
works” exception was not applicable in the case before it, the court
did little to clarify when the exception would apply. Our coverage of
Florida cases concludes with Pollock v. Florida Department of Highway Patrol,6 where the supreme court ruled that the Highway Patrol
does not owe the public a duty to maintain safe highways.
Additionally, for this Issue, we have included coverage on two
statutes enacted in 2004 by the Florida Legislature. Each statute enacts an immunity from civil liability; one statute is an effective implementation of immunity while the other is not. Under the amendment to the Florida Good Samaritan Act,7 the Legislature extended
civil immunity to volunteers who assist in emergency efforts, so long
as they act as a reasonably prudent person—this, of course, is the
same standard to which ordinary citizens are always held. Conversely, under section 768.37,8 the Legislature effectively immunized
sellers and manufacturers of food from civil liability for injuries or
disease allegedly caused by long-term consumption of foods. This is a
legislative response to an infamous tort suit against McDonald’s; the
efficacy of the statute makes an interesting juxtaposition with the
amendment to the Good Samaritan Act. We hope you enjoy the Notes
that follow.
CRIMINAL LAW—REAFFIRMING MIRANDA—UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT HOLDS MIRANDA WARNINGS INEFFECTIVE WHEN GIVEN MIDINTERROGATION—Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
Recently, in Missouri v. Seibert,9 a plurality of the United States
Supreme Court held Miranda10 warnings given mid-interrogation
were ineffective, resulting in the inadmissibility of both pre- and
post-warning statements.11 This Note first describes the factual cir-

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
trial of

887 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2004).
888 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004).
882 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2004).
FLA. STAT. § 768.13 (2004).
Id. § 768.37.
124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The Seibert Court characterized Miranda as “condition[ing] the admissibility at
any custodial confession on warning a suspect of his rights: failure to give the pre-
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cumstances and procedural history of Missouri v. Seibert. Next, the
Note discusses Justice Souter’s plurality opinion, Justice Breyer’s
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy’s opinion which concurs in the
judgment, and Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion. Finally, the
Note discusses likely future implications of the Court’s decision.
Patrice Seibert was arrested in connection with the death of Donald Rector, a mentally ill teenager who lived with Seibert and was
killed when a fire destroyed Seibert’s home. Following her arrest, although detained and interrogated at the police station,12 she was not
advised of her Miranda rights until after she admitted that she intended for Donald to die in the fire.13 Subsequent to her confession, a
police officer guided her through a series of questions, and Seibert
repeated her pre-Miranda confession.14 Seibert was charged with
first-degree murder. At trial, she sought to suppress both her preand post-warning statements.15
At the suppression hearing, the interrogating officer testified that
his “conscious decision” to withhold Miranda warnings was in accordance with a local policy that required officers to “question first, then
give the [Miranda] warnings, and then repeat the question” until the
suspect repeats his or her answer to the pre-warning question.16
At trial, the court suppressed the pre-warning admission but permitted the post-warning statements—Seibert was convicted of second-degree murder.17 The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
decision; however, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the post-warning statements, in addition to the pre-warning
statements, should have been excluded because the officer intentionally withheld the necessary warnings to achieve a deliberate “end
run” around Miranda.18 Missouri appealed, and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split.19
scribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of any statements obtained.” 124 S. Ct. at 2608.
12. Seibert was left alone for fifteen to twenty minutes in an interview room and then
interrogated for thirty to forty minutes before she admitted that she intended for Donald to
die in the fire. Id. at 2606.
13. After Seibert confessed, she was given a twenty-minute break and was then informed of her rights under Miranda. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. This technique is known as a two-stage interrogation. See id. at 2608-09.
17. Id. at 2606.
18. State v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 706-07 (Mo. 2002), aff’d, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
19. The D.C. Circuit indicated in United States v. Gale, 952 F.2d 1412, 1418 (D.C. Cir.
1992), that a “deliberate ‘end run’ around Miranda” would be grounds for suppression.
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit held that Supreme Court precedent prohibits a deliberate
“end run around Miranda.” United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 373 (8th Cir. 1989).
However, both the First and Ninth Circuits subsequently issued contrary decisions. See
United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d
1030 (9th Cir. 2001).
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Justice Souter’s plurality opinion affirmed the Missouri Supreme
Court20 but rejected Missouri’s claim that the Court’s previous decision in Oregon v. Elstad21 permits the type of “question-first” strategy
employed in Seibert.22 Souter further explained that the facts at issue
in Seibert are “[a]t the opposite extreme” from those in Elstad because an analysis of the facts in Seibert revealed that a question-first
strategy undermined the purpose and effectiveness of Miranda.23
Thus, the plurality affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court and, in so
holding, provided that future cases must be decided in accordance
with the above standard, looking to whether the strategy undercuts
Miranda.
Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion that advocated a “simple rule” for the two-stage interrogation technique under which
courts “should exclude the ‘fruits’[24] of the initial unwarned question-

20. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613.
21. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). In Elstad, the police apprehended a young burglary suspect
at his mother’s house. However, before being advised of his Miranda rights, the suspect
admitted he was present at the scene of the crime. The suspect was then taken to the police station, given Miranda warnings, and interrogated. He confessed, and the Supreme
Court held that the post-warning statements were admissible. Id. at 318. In so holding, the
Court reasoned that “a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any
actual coercion or other circumstances” would not render “a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver . . . ineffective for some indeterminate period.” Id. at 309. Thus, even though
“Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of
any subsequent statement should turn . . . solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.” Id.
22. Souter reasoned:
The contrast between Elstad and this case reveals a series of relevant facts
that bear on whether Miranda warnings delivered midstream could be effective
enough to accomplish their object: the completeness and detail of the questions
and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the
two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator’s questions
treated the second round as continuous with the first. In Elstad, it was not unreasonable to see the occasion for questioning at the station house as presenting a markedly different experience from the short conversation at home; since
a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes could have seen the station house
questioning as a new and distinct experience, the Miranda warnings could
have made sense as presenting a genuine choice whether to follow up on the
earlier admission.
Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612.
23. See id.
24. Justice Breyer derived the “fruit” reference from the “fruit of the poisonous tree”
doctrine, which developed, and is commonly employed, within the context of the Fourth
Amendment. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine provides that “evidence otherwise admissible but discovered as a result
of an earlier violation is excluded as tainted [to deter] future violations.” Seibert, 124 S. Ct.
at 2610 n.4. Importantly, however, the Supreme Court has rejected the doctrine’s application within the context of a Miranda case. See id. (noting that, in Elstad, the Court “rejected the . . . fruits doctrine for analyzing the admissibility of a subsequent warned confession following ‘an initial failure . . . to administer the warnings required by Miranda’”
(quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300)).
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ing unless the failure to warn was in good faith.”25 Justice Kennedy
wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he acknowledged that the plurality’s opinion “envisions an objective inquiry
from the perspective of the suspect, and applies in the case of both intentional and unintentional two-stage interrogations.”26 However, he
reasoned that a “narrower test” should apply where, in subjective bad
faith, an officer employs a two-step interrogation technique to frustrate Miranda’s purpose.27 Thus, Kennedy would have realized a subjective bad-faith exception, outside of which Elstad would control.28
Conversely, Justices O’Connor, Thomas, Scalia, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, as explained in O’Connor’s dissent, would find Elstad controlling.29 Consequently, within the context of a two-step interrogation procedure, under the dissent’s view a post-warning statement
would be suppressed only where a defendant established that the
statement was involuntary.30
Because Seibert is a plurality decision, its future implications are
debatable. At minimum, it is clear that a post-warning confession
will be suppressed if, as in Seibert, the police acted in a deliberate
manner in order to undermine Miranda.31 Conversely, it is equally
clear that a police officer will deny any strategy or intent to purposely withhold Miranda during interrogation. Thus, Seibert prohibits an intentional two-step interrogation process; however, lower
courts may employ the plurality’s test to determine whether the interrogation strategy undermines Miranda.
FLORIDA RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT—FLORIDA SUPREME
COURT HOLDS THAT A GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW MAY NOT IMPOSE
A BURDEN UPON A GENUINELY HELD RELIGIOUS BELIEF—Warner v.
City of Boca Raton, 887 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2004).
In response to the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Employment Division v. Smith,32 the United States Congress, in 1993,
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).33 Prior to
Smith, the Court had adopted a rule that any law of general applicability which substantially burdens an individual’s religious practices

25. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613 (Breyer, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. Id. (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
30. Id. at 2619; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
31. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2612.
32. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
33. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to
2000bb-4 (2000)).
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would violate the Free Exercise Clause34 if the law was not narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.35 In Smith,
however, the Court found that only narrow exceptions permit the application of strict scrutiny to neutral laws of general applicability.36
Smith turned decades of free exercise precedent upside down and, in
the minds of many religious freedom advocates, was a potential vacuum to the right of free exercise of religion.37
Attempting to cure Smith and appease the litany of religious freedom advocates, Congress passed the RFRA to restore the compelling
interest test.38 But RFRA’s relief was merely temporary as the Court
declared it unconstitutional just four years later in City of Boerne v.
Flores.39 In Boerne, the Court found the RFRA unconstitutional as
applied to the states40 because it exceeded its enforcement and remedial powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.41 Following this setback, religious freedom advocates took their cause directly
to state legislatures.
In response to these advocates and their concerns, Florida, in
1998, passed its own version of the federal RFRA: the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act (FRFRA).42 Similar to the RFRA, the
Florida version intended to reestablish the pre-Smith compelling interest test.43 According to the FRFRA, the government may only substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion if it can demonstrate
that the application of the burden to the person is in furtherance of a
compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of
furthering this interest.44

34. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (stating that a “state
may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means
of achieving some compelling state interest.”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (rejecting the use of the rational basis standard when evaluating religious freedom claims).
36. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-84. The Smith Court specifically stated that “[w]e have
never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.” Id.
37. See Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1280 (S.D. Fla. 1999)
(“The Smith decision was met with widespread disapproval by those who viewed the decision as a departure from settled free exercise jurisprudence and as a dramatic curtailment
of religious freedom.”).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4), (b)(1).
39. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
40. Id. at 536. RFRA may or may not be constitutional as applied to the federal government. See Adams v. Comm’r, 170 F.3d 173, 175 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999).
41. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
42. FLA. STAT. §§ 761.01-05 (2004).
43. See id. § 761.03(1)(a).
44. Id. § 761.03(1). Specifically, the FRFRA, in pertinent part, provides:
(1) The government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except that
government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person:
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In Warner v. City of Boca Raton,45 the Florida Supreme Court addressed two distinct, unanswered FRFRA-related questions: (1)
whether the FRFRA broadens—and, if so, to what extent it broadens—the protection afforded to the free exercise of religious activity
by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court; and (2) whether
a City of Boca Raton ordinance—prohibiting vertical grave markers,
memorials, monuments, and structures on its cemetery plots—
violates the FRFRA.46
The dispute in Warner involved a cemetery that the City of Boca
Raton (the “City”) owned, operated, and maintained for its residents.
In November 1982, the City adopted a regulation prohibiting vertical
grave markers, memorials, and monuments and other structures (collectively referred to as “grave decorations”) on its cemetery plots.47
Later, in 1996, the City amended the regulation “to permit some vertical grave decorations up to sixty days from the date of burial and on
certain holidays.”48 The appellants were plot owners who decorated
the graves of their family members and loved ones with standing
statues, crosses, stars of David, and other vertical grave decorations
between 1984 and 1996 in violation of the regulation.49 They were
given an ultimatum: if they did not comply with the regulation by
January 15, 1998, the City would remove all of the noncomplying
decorations.50 Subsequently, the appellants brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida alleging, among other constitutional claims, that the regulation violated the FRFRA.
Judge Kenneth L. Ryskamp of the district court found that the
prohibition of vertical grave decorations on cemetery plots did not
violate the FRFRA.51 The court found that, while marking graves
with religious symbols constitutes a practice of appellants’ religious
traditions, the particular practice of using vertical grave decorations
reflects a “matter of purely personal preference regarding religious
exercise,” which is not protected by the FRFRA.52 Hence, the court
determined that the regulation did not violate the FRFRA because it
did not substantially burden appellants’ practice of religion.53 The
(a) Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(b) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.
Id. (emphasis added).
45. 887 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2004).
46. Id. at 1024.
47. Id. at 1025
48. Id.
49. Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1277 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
50. Warner, 887 So. 2d at 1025.
51. See Warner, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
52. Id. at 1283-84.
53. See id. at 1288-89.
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appellants appealed the decision to the Eleventh Circuit, which certified the aforementioned two questions to the Florida Supreme
Court.54
As to the first question, the Florida Supreme Court found that the
protection afforded to the free exercise of religion under the FRFRA
is broader than that afforded by the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. Accordingly, the FRFRA “reinstates the Court’s preSmith holdings by applying the compelling interest test to neutral
laws of general applica[bility].”55 This standard, however, does not
support the proposition that any act motivated by religion is subject
to the compelling state interest test; rather, the only government
regulations subject to the compelling interest standard are those that
“substantially burden” an individual’s exercise of religion.56 Although
there are several definitions of “substantial burden” at the federal
level with regard to the RFRA,57 the court adopted the narrowest version.58 This definition, endorsed by the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits, provides that a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion exists where a law “either compels the religious adherent to
engage in conduct that his religion forbids or forbids him to engage in
conduct that his religion requires.”59 In other words, a compelling interest inquiry is applicable whether or not the substantial burden results from a rule of general applicability; thus, the court held that the
FRFRA broadens the free exercise rights afforded by previous United
States Supreme Court decisions.
The court’s narrow definition of what creates a substantial burden
on the free exercise of religion raises common, yet enigmatic, Establishment Clause issues.60 The United States Supreme Court has explicitly stated that “[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of
particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”61 Thus, courts
should not be “required to interpret and weigh religious doctrine to
54. Warner, 887 So. 2d at 1033; see supra text accompanying note 46.
55. Id. at 1032.
56. Id. at 1033.
57. There are several definitions, ranging from broad to narrow, of what is a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion available at the federal level. The broadest definition, adopted by the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, provides that an individual is substantially burdened where a law “significantly inhibit[s] or constrain[s] conduct or expression
that manifests some central tenet of a [person’s] individual beliefs.” Werner v. McCotter,
49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68 (8th Cir.
1994).
58. See Warner, 887 So. 2d at 1033-34.
59. Id. at 1033.
60. The First Amendment, which in part provides that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” prohibits
the government from passing legislation to establish an official religion or preferring one
religion over another. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
61. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
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determine the centrality of a particular practice to a religious tradition.”62 But in order to apply the Florida Supreme Court’s substantial
burden element of the FRFRA analysis in Warner, courts are left to
determine whether a law “compels the religious adherent to engage
in conduct that his religion forbids . . . or forbids him to engage in
conduct that his religion requires.”63 If an act is required or forbidden
by a religion, it could be said that that act is central to the religion.
In other words, courts will have to determine whether a particular
practice is central to a religious tradition despite the United States
Supreme Court’s warning “that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of
a religious claim.”64
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, recognizing this potential Establishment Clause problem, attempted to take a middle ground when analyzing FRFRA claims by
limiting a court’s inquiry only to whether “the practice in question reflect[s] some tenet, custom or practice of a larger system of religious
beliefs.”65 But by adopting the narrow definition of substantial burden, the Florida Supreme Court has arguably created the “risk of
courts taking sides in religious controversies” because courts must
determine whether a burdened belief is central to one’s religion.66 Arguably, if courts apply the Warner substantial burden standard to
FRFRA claims, plaintiffs who believe in and practice traditional religions with established history—especially with widely recognized
written texts, such as Christianity, Islam, and Judaism—are likely to
receive favorable treatment because these plaintiffs will face a less
difficult task of showing what the religion requires or forbids; and on
the other hand, litigants who practice lesser known religions without
a widely recognized text will arguably face a more difficult task in
meeting this high burden. This standard, in essence, may implicitly
endorse those who practice mainstream religions over practitioners of
minority, nontraditional religions.
Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court’s adoption of what constitutes a substantial burden is inconsistent with the explicit language of the FRFRA. The FRFRA defines the “exercise of religion” as
“an act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by a religious
belief, whether or not the religious exercise is compulsory or central
to a larger system of religious belief.”67 But in finding that a litigant’s
free exercise right has been substantially burdened solely when a law
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1284 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
Warner, 887 So. 2d at 1033.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990).
Warner, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 1284.
See id.
FLA. STAT. § 761.02(3) (2004) (emphasis added).
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forbids a required practice or requires a forbidden practice, it appears
the court has endorsed a standard whereby only exercises that are
“central to a larger system of beliefs” are protected under the FRFRA.
The court’s adoption of such a narrow definition appears to conflict
with the Florida Legislature’s intent “to expand the scope of protection afforded to religious practices.”68
In answering the second certified question—whether the City
regulation violates FRFRA—the Florida Supreme Court applied the
substantial burden analysis and found that the regulation did not
violate the FRFRA.69 The court, in holding for the City, outlined the
general framework for all future FRFRA claims. First, “the plaintiff
bears the initial burden of showing that a regulation constitutes a
substantial burden on his or her free exercise of religion.”70 If the
plaintiff meets this initial burden, then the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate “that the regulation furthers a compelling
governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest.”71
The court did not find it necessary to discuss the compelling governmental interest and the least restrictive means analysis because
it found that the City’s regulation did not substantially burden the
appellants’ free exercise of religion, and therefore did not violate the
FRFRA.72 A fact the court found significant in concluding there was
no FRFRA violation was that the regulation permitted vertical grave
decorations for sixty days following the date of burial and for a lim-

68. Warner, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 1281.
69. Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2004).
70. Id. at 1034 (citing FLA. STAT. § 761.03(1)). Many FRFRA cases will likely be dismissed because of this initial element of the analysis, due to the court’s adoption of the
narrow definition of what constitutes a substantial burden. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
In setting forth the FRFRA analysis, however, the court has arguably taken a step back
from its narrow definition of substantial burden set forth earlier in its opinion because the
court states that the first step requires that plaintiffs “demonstrate that the government has
placed a substantial burden on a practice motivated by a sincere religious belief.” Id. (emphasis added). But the Southern District Court’s definition of a sincere religious belief is a less
stringent standard than the Florida Supreme Court’s; the Southern District’s definition of a
sincere religious belief is the equivalent of a “tenet, custom, or practice of the religious tradition.” Warner, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 1285. However, this standard conflicts with the Florida Supreme Court definition of a sincere religious belief, which entails practices that a religion requires or forbids. See Warner, 887 So. 2d at 1033. Thus, the plaintiff’s initial requirement of
showing a substantial burden on the individual’s exercise of religion is a broader, more plaintiff-friendly standard under the Southern District’s interpretation of FRFRA. But whether
the Florida Supreme Court endorses its narrow standard and inadvertently used the Southern District’s language or genuinely meant to adopt a broader standard is unclear. It should
also be noted that if the Florida Supreme Court did, in fact, adopt the Southern District’s
broader language, it arguably corrects the potential Establishment Clause problems that
could arise from the narrow interpretation. See supra notes 55-66.
71. Warner, 887 So. 2d at 1034 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 761.03(1)(a), (b)).
72. Id. at 1035.
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ited period around certain holidays.73 Therefore, the court found that
the regulation—restricting the manner in which grave decorations
may be displayed—“merely inconvenience[d] the [appellants’] practices of marking graves and decorating them with religious symbols”
and did not substantially burden the appellants’ free exercise of religion.74
WORKER’S COMPENSATION—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT
THE
“UNRELATED WORKS” EXCEPTION TO THE WORKER’S
COMPENSATION STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY WHEN EMPLOYEES ACT IN
FURTHERANCE OF THE EMPLOYER’S BUSINESS—Taylor v. School
Board of Brevard County, 888 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004).
A primary function, if not the primary function, of the Supreme
Court of Florida is to develop articulable and well-reasoned principles
of decisional law that will guide lower courts, lawyers, citizens, and
agencies.75 For example, when a statute is ambiguous, the court
should interpret it in a manner that gives lower courts a framework
to achieve consistent and proper results when the issue again surfaces.76 In Taylor v. School Board of Brevard County,77 the Supreme
Court of Florida failed to perform this function when construing the
“unrelated works” exception to immunity under the Florida worker’s
compensation scheme.78 Not only did the court decline to adopt any
parameters to guide lower courts, but it simultaneously failed to follow a basic tenet of statutory interpretation—that a “statute should
be interpreted to give effect to every clause in it, and to accord meaning and harmony to all of its parts.”79

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Howard A. Levine, The Regulation of Foreign-Educated Lawyers in New York:
The Past, Present, and Future of New York’s Role in the Regulation of the International
Practice of Law, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 631, 633 (2003); Daniel J. Meador, Afterword, 15
J.L. & POL. 567, 570 (1999).
76. See Meador, supra note 75, at 570; see also Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So.
2d 303 (Fla. 2004) (urging the Legislature to revisit a statute containing neither defined
critical terms nor standards set for ascertaining compliance); State v. Ruiz, 863 So. 2d
1205, 1210 (Fla. 2003) (“As the Supreme Court of the State of Florida, ‘one of our primary
judicial functions is to interpret statutes and constitutional provisions.’” (quoting Locke v.
Hawkes, 595 So. 2d 32, 36 (Fla. 1992))).
77. 888 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004).
78. Id. at 6 (Lewis, J., concurring in result only). The “unrelated works” exception to
the general worker’s compensation scheme, which provides that the worker’s compensation
statute is the employee’s exclusive remedy in an injury action against his employer, is as
follows: “[S]uch immunities [shall not] be applicable to employees of the same employer
when each is operating in the furtherance of the employer’s business but they are assigned
primarily to unrelated works within private or public employment.” FLA. STAT. § 440.11
(2004).
79. State ex rel. City of Casselberry v. Mager, 356 So. 2d 267, 269 n.5 (Fla. 1978).
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Florida has a comprehensive worker’s compensation scheme that
provides injured workers with benefits without proof of fault while,
at the same time, insulating employers from tort claims.80 Section
440.11(1),81 however, permits an injured worker to bring claims
against an employer for negligent acts of coworkers “when each is operating in the furtherance of the employer’s business but they are assigned primarily to unrelated works within private or public employment.”82 The Taylor court concluded that this exception should
apply only when a claimant clearly demonstrates that the negligent
actions of a fellow employee who has engaged in tasks unrelated to
the duties of the claimant caused the injury.83 Under the court’s
analysis, the exception will likely never be applicable. Moreover,
lower courts were not given the direction needed to determine if the
facts of a particular case warrant the exception.
In deciding Taylor, the Florida Supreme Court was presented with
the opportunity to resolve a conflict between the Fifth District
Court’s decision in Taylor84 and the Second District Court’s decision
in Lopez v. Vilches.85 In Taylor, the petitioner was a school bus attendant who was injured when a wheelchair lift fell on him because his
co-employee negligently repaired the lift four months earlier.86 Taylor
filed suit against the school board, arguing that the board was not
entitled to immunity because he and the mechanics were involved in
unrelated work.87 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of the board, and the Fifth District affirmed because Taylor and the
mechanics worked out of the same facility and both had responsibilities regarding the wheelchair lift.88
The underlying facts in Lopez were similar. Lopez, a van driver for
a funeral home, was injured due to the negligence of those who maintained the van.89 The Second District reversed the trial court’s entry
of summary judgment against Lopez, holding that “[t]he physical location of [the co-employees’] work appears to be separate and their
80. See Taylor, 888 So. 2d at 2.
81. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1).
82. Id.; see also Taylor, 888 So. 2d at 3. Judge Lewis, in his concurrence, more clearly
explained that section 440.11(1) grants an injured employee the right to sue a negligent coemployee, but does not permit the employee to prosecute the action due to section
768.28(9)(a). Id. at 7 (Lewis, J., concurring in the result only). Thus, in Holmes County
School Board v. Duffell, 651 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 1995), the court held that the employee could
recover from the employer as a surrogate defendant based on the negligent acts of a coemployee, id. at 1179.
83. 888 So. 2d at 52.
84. Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County, 790 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), approved by 888 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004).
85. 734 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
86. 790 So. 2d at 1156-57.
87. Id. at 1157.
88. Id. at 1157-58.
89. Lopez, 734 So. 2d at 1096.
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specific purpose, general funeral home duties versus vehicle maintenance, appear distinct.”90 The Florida Supreme Court approved of the
Fifth District’s decision in Taylor and disapproved of the Second District’s decision in Lopez, holding that both employees shared a “common goal” of safely transporting students to school.91
The majority and concurring opinions both focus on determining
whether the co-employees’ tasks were “unrelated works,” but they ignore the preceding clause of the statute which clarifies, to some extent, the scope and context in which the Florida Legislature intended
the unrelated works exception to be viewed. The clause provides an
exception to employer immunity “when each [co-employee] is operating in the furtherance of the employer’s business but they are assigned
primarily to unrelated works . . . .”92 Thus, looking at Taylor, the
school board’s business is the education of children. The court summarily held the works not unrelated because all co-employees shared
a common goal of safe transportation. Giving credence to the preceding clause of section 440.11(1), the inquiry should have been whether,
within the business of educating children, driving as opposed to
maintaining a school bus is an unrelated work.93 Undoubtedly, the
court made the correct decision. However, by not giving effect to the
clause preceding the unrelated works clause—the “operating in the
furtherance of the employer’s business”94 clause—the court encourages lower courts to disregard it. Failure to recognize the clause permits lower courts to make decisions against the plain language of the
statute and the Legislature’s intent.95
A case in point is the Third District’s decision in Dade County
School Board v. Laing.96 In Laing, a teacher was leaving class when
he was struck by a golf cart driven by a school custodian.97 The court
granted immunity to the school board, holding that the works were
not unrelated because the court found both employees were involved

90. Id. at 1097.
91. Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County, 888 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004).
92. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (2004) (emphasis added).
93. The ambiguity of the unrelated works exception is clarified, at least as to the
proper scope of the inquiry, by the complete statutory scheme. See Jones v. ETS of New Orleans, Inc., 793 So. 2d 912, 915 (Fla. 2001) (“Accordingly, ‘statutory phrases are not to be
read in isolation, but rather within the context of the entire section.’” (quoting Acosta v.
Richter, 671 So. 2d 149, 154 (Fla. 1996))); accord Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228
(1993) (“Just as a single word cannot be read in isolation, nor can a single provision of a
statute.”).
94. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1).
95. The Legislature intended that the worker’s compensation statute should not be
interpreted liberally in favor of either party—the employer or the employee. See id. As discussed infra, Florida courts interpret the exception in favor of the employer. See infra
notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
96. 731 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
97. Id. at 20.

986

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:973

in promoting education.98 This analysis is specifically prohibited by a
plain reading of the statute. The school board’s business is promoting
education. Therefore, the relevant inquiry is whether teaching and
custodial duties are unrelated works within the scope of promoting
education. Common sense dictates that they are. In a later case, Sanchez v. Dade County School Board, the Third District upheld the
Laing decision, holding that a teacher and a security guard were not
engaged in unrelated works.99
Two other cases provide further examples of lower courts reading
out the “in the furtherance of the employer’s business” clause. In
Vause v. Bay Medical Center,100 the First District examined a situation where a nurse, primarily practicing in a hospital’s obstetric department, died due to her co-employees’ improper operation—in another department—of a hyperbaric machine.101 The court used broad
language in holding that neither the nurse, operator, nor a hospital
administrator were engaged in unrelated works because all were involved in “[t]he provision of health care to patients of the medical
center.”102 The holding may be correct as to the machine operator because, reading the situation as section 440.11(1) mandates, in the
business of providing health care, the nurse and the operator were
involved in the work of caring for a specific patient.103 However, as to
the administrator, in the business of providing health care, nursing
and administration are undoubtedly unrelated works.104 Likewise,
the Fourth District in Fitzgerald v. South Broward Hospital District
held that surgical nurses and maintenance personnel were not involved in unrelated works.105
These decisions all hold that when employees are acting in furtherance of the employer’s business, the employer is immune—a contention against the plain language of the statute. The Florida Supreme Court’s failure to construe the statute as it is written will simply misguide lower courts in making their decisions; moreover, it
erodes the unrelated works exception. Every employee is acting, in
one form or another, in the furtherance of her employer’s business.106
98. Id.
99. 784 So. 2d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
100. 687 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
101. Id. at 260.
102. Id. at 263.
103. Id.
104. Judge Lewis pointed this out in his Taylor concurrence, stating that “the administrator of the hospital should not likewise enjoy immunity from suit because his work is unrelated to that of the nurse.” Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County, 888 So. 2d 1, 15 (Fla.
2004) (Lewis, J., concurring in the result only).
105. 840 So. 2d 460, 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
106. Oddly, the Taylor court recognized this fact when it noted that “in one sense, all
employees of the same employer could always be considered engaged in related works since
they are all charged to carry out the mission of the employer.” Taylor, 888 So. 2d at 5. Even
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By ignoring the statutory language and the legislature’s intent, the
unrelated works exception will likely never apply.107
Judge Lewis concurred in the result only.108 His analysis focuses
on the fact that the court “fail[ed] to adopt any parameters to provide
assistance to the lower courts in the application of the unrelated
works exception found in section 440.11(1).”109 Judge Lewis’s analysis
supports the argument that lower court decisions have interpreted
the statute in a manner that eviscerates the exception.110 However,
he conducted a survey of tests used by lower courts to determine
whether co-employee works were unrelated.111
Judge Lewis determined that the question whether works are unrelated should be analyzed under a combination of two tests—the
physical business location test and the same project-business purpose
test.112 Four situations illustrate Judge Lewis’s vision. First, where
co-employees are not assigned tasks at the same physical business location and the work is not part of the same project, the exception is
inapplicable as a matter of law.113 Second, where the employees are
not working at the same physical business location but are directed
to perform tasks where an injury occurs and the work performed is
part of the same business project with co-employees, the exception is
inapplicable as a matter of law in regard to other co-employees involved in the project.114 Third, where co-employees are assigned tasks
at the same physical business location and the tasks are part of the
same project, the exception is inapplicable as a matter of law.115 Finally, when co-employees are assigned tasks at the same physical
business location where an injury results but the tasks are not part
of the same business project, the unrelated works exception applies
as a matter of law.116

with this admission, the court failed to give effect to every clause in section 440.11(1). The
question the statute requires is whether, within that mission, the works are unrelated.
107. While not explicitly stating that courts were reading out part of the statute, Judge
Lewis’ concurrence noted that the “interpretation [given by these courts] would render all
hospital and similar employees [as being] engaged in the same ‘mission,’ and the unrelated
works exception would, therefore, never be applicable.” Id. at 12 (Lewis, J., concurring in
the result only).
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 11 (stating that the Vause “decision contains language which describes a
project far too broadly” and that the Third District definition of “project” would make it difficult to have a situation where any school employees could ever be engaged in unrelated
works). See also supra note 104 and accompanying text.
111. Id. at 8-14.
112. Id. at 14.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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This framework should be utilized by lower courts when determining whether works are unrelated—at least Judge Lewis’s concurrence
attempts to fulfill the court’s primary function of guiding lower
courts, lawyers, citizens, and agencies. However, this framework
should only be applied after recognizing the scope mandated by section 440.11(1). For now, the Taylor decision has denied lower courts
both the proper scope and framework to determine whether the unrelated works exception applies. Maybe, as suggested by Judge Lewis,
“the best solution would be for the Legislature itself to amend the
statute to define ‘unrelated works’ or provide more specific wording.”117
TORTS—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT THE FLORIDA
HIGHWAY PATROL DOES NOT HAVE A COMMON LAW DUTY TO
MAINTAIN FLORIDA’S HIGHWAYS—Pollock v. Florida Department of
Highway Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2004).
Florida has waived sovereign immunity from liability in tort actions “for any act for which a private person under similar circumstances would be held liable.”118 Therefore, “there can be no governmental liability unless a common law or statutory duty of care existed that would have been applicable to an individual under similar
circumstances.”119 If no duty of care is owed, then the question of governmental liability need not be reached.120 Conversely, if a duty of
care exists, then it must be determined if sovereign immunity bars
an action for a breach of this duty.121 This judgment necessitates a
determination of the character of the alleged negligent governmental
act or omission.122 In Pollock v. Florida Department of Highway Patrol, the Florida Supreme Court explained that “basic judgmental or
discretionary governmental functions are immune from legal action,
whereas operational acts are not protected by sovereign immunity.”123
The Pollock court addressed both the issue of sovereign immunity
and the issue whether the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) owed a
duty of care to maintain Florida’s highways. The tragic facts of Pollock may, at first, cause an individual to disagree with the court for
not compensating the plaintiff. Yet, as this Note will conclude, the
court’s decision was clearly correct from a legal standpoint.

117. Id. at 13.
118. Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So. 2d 532, 534-35 (Fla. 1999).
119. Id. at 535.
120. See Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732, 734 (Fla. 1989) (explaining that the question
of immunity does not arise unless the defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff).
121. See Henderson, 737 So. 2d at 535.
122. See Pollock v. Fla. Dep’t of Hwy. Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928, 933 (Fla. 2004).
123. Id.
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Early in the morning on September 5, 1993, Suzanne Leeds and
Elissa Pollock were traveling on the Palmetto Expressway.124 They
were killed instantly when their vehicle collided into the back of a
stalled tractor-trailer.125 An hour earlier, Raul Pedrero nearly hit the
recently abandoned tractor-trailer while traveling home on the Palmetto Expressway.126 Pedrero subsequently exited the expressway
and went to a gas station where he phoned 911.127 His call was transferred to the FHP; Pedrero informed the dispatcher of the stalled,
unlit tractor-trailer on the Palmetto Expressway.128 He was informed
that an officer would be sent to the scene.129 FHP’s dispatcher, however, failed to enter the call into the computer for assignment.130 As a
result, no officer was sent to the scene and the tractor-trailer remained stalled and unlit on the Palmetto Expressway as Suzanne
Leeds and Elissa Pollock approached.131
The families of the deceased brought tort actions against the FHP
for failing to safely maintain the expressway.132 At the time of the incident, FHP had internal operating rules requiring it to dispatch a
trooper to the scene of stalled vehicles; moreover, officers were available that morning to answer the call had it gone out.133 Additionally,
Rule 12.00.00 of the FHP Communication Policy/Procedures Manual,
entitled “Crash Prevention,” provides as follows: “Crash prevention
and crash investigation are the primary functions of the Florida
Highway Patrol and the duty officer’s role in these endeavors are of
major importance. Strict adherence to this chapter will enable every
officer to handle these responsibilities in an efficient and professional
manner.”134
At trial, the jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs.135 On appeal,
the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and directed that final judgment be entered in favor of the FHP.136 The
124. State v. Pollack, 745 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) quashed sub nom. by Pollock v. Fla. Dep’t of Hwy. Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2004). The Florida Supreme Court
spelled the party’s name as “Pollock” rather than following the district court’s spelling because “[t]he parties . . . consistently refer[red] to the personal representative and the deceased as ‘Pollock’” during the supreme court’s proceedings. Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 930 n.2.
125. Pollack, 745 So. 2d at 447.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 448. Originally, the Pollock and Leeds actions were brought separately;
however, the Leeds action was subsequently transferred to the circuit court where the Pollock’s case was pending, and the two cases were consolidated for trial. Id.
133. Id. at 447.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 448.
136. Id. at 451.
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Third District held that there was no indication that FHP’s inaction
was operational in nature and that FHP owed no special duty to the
decedents as a matter of law.137 The court also certified a conflict with
Hoover v. Polk County Sheriff’s Department138 and Cook v. Sheriff of
Collier County,139 despite finding these cases distinguishable from a
procedural standpoint from the case at issue.140
In Pollock, the petitioners argued to the Florida Supreme Court
that there was a duty of care on the part of FHP based on two separate sources. First, they claimed that as the governmental entity
charged with patrolling the state’s highways, the FHP has a duty to
maintain those highways in a safe condition, to warn of dangers, and
to correct dangerous conditions.141 Second, they argued that FHP’s
policies and procedures manual created a duty to dispatch an officer
to the scene of a stalled vehicle.142 The Florida Supreme Court rejected both these arguments. This Note will discuss the rationale for
each rejection in turn.
The court began its analysis by noting that “[i]t is well settled that
a public or private entity which owns, operates, or controls a property, including a roadway, owes a duty to maintain that property,
and a corresponding duty to warn of and correct dangerous conditions thereon.”143 The court concluded, however, that this theory did
not apply in Pollock because FHP had no ownership of, or control
over, Florida’s highways.144 Moreover, the court noted that under the
statutory scheme at the time of the accident, the responsibility for
the maintenance of the roads belonged to the Florida Department of
Transportation and local governments.145 Additionally, FHP’s enabling statute did not afford the agency ownership or control over
Florida’s highways.146 The court held that the statutory language
made it permissive, rather than mandatory, for the FHP to respond
to stalled vehicles on Florida’s highways.147
The court further stated that controlling the flow of traffic and enforcing the traffic laws are duties the FHP owes to the general public

137. Id. at 450.
138. 611 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), disapproved in part by Pollock v. Fla. Dep’t of
Hwy. Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2004).
139. 573 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), disapproved in part by Pollock v. Fla. Dep’t of
Hwy. Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2004).
140. Pollack, 745 So. 2d at 450-51.
141. Pollock v. Fla. Dep’t of Hwy. Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928, 933 (Fla. 2004).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 934.
145. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 335.04(2) (1993) (repealed 1995).
146. Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 934; see also FLA. STAT. § 316.194(3)(a) (1993).
147. Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 934.
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rather than to an individual person.148 According to the court, a duty
to enforce laws for the good of the public at large cannot create a duty
to act with care toward a specific individual, “unless an official assumes a special duty with regard to that person.”149
A special duty does exist when law enforcement officials become
directly involved in circumstances that place people in a “zone of
risk.”150 The court explained that where police officers have not arrived at the scene or taken control over the situation, the “zone of
risk” analysis is not applicable.151 Thus, FHP could not be held liable
on such a theory.
The court further noted that a special duty can arise when a police
officer makes a direct representation to a plaintiff that he or she will
take a specific law enforcement action.152 Relying on Dario v. Roth,153
the court found this theory to be inapplicable in the present case. In
Dario, a dispatcher in a sheriff’s office had informed a caller that the
sheriff’s office would respond to reports of a loose deer.154 The sheriff
failed to respond; later, a motorist was injured in an automobile collision with the deer.155 On these facts the Third District Court of Appeal held that the sheriff did not owe a duty to the subsequent motorist.156 The Pollock court explained that,
[l]ike the defendant in Dario, FHP did not, by word or deed, create
a duty of care toward the decedents over and above its general
duty to enforce the state’s traffic laws. Thus, FHP owed no duty of
care to the decedents to respond to the emergency call regarding
the stalled tractor-trailer.157

The court then addressed the petitioners’ claim that the FHP’s internal operating procedures manual created a duty for FHP to dispatch officers to the scene of stalled vehicles. The court held that the
FHP’s internal operating policies and procedures created no such
duty:
While a written policy or manual may be instructive in determining whether the alleged tortfeasor acted negligently in fulfilling an

148. Id. at 935 (citing Trianon Park Condo. Ass’n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912,
921-22 (Fla. 1985)).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 935-36.
152. Id. at 936.
153. 756 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).
154. Id. at 263.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 265.
157. Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 936.
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independently established duty of care, it does not itself establish
such a legal duty vis-à-vis individual members of the public.158

In sum, the court held that FHP had no special duty either to maintain the road on which the accident occurred or to dispatch an officer
to the scene of the stalled vehicle.
Finding that FHP did not have a common law duty determined
the outcome of the case, thereby making moot the issue whether FHP
was shielded by sovereign immunity. However, the court addressed
the issue in order to clarify potential confusion caused by the district
court opinion.159 Regarding the issue of sovereign immunity, the district court made this statement: “Based upon the foregoing we find
that FHP’s actions or inactions were not operational in nature and
that no special duty was owed to decedents so as to constitute a
waiver of sovereign immunity.”160 The supreme court addressed the
district court’s statement as follows:
We believe the foregoing excerpt could be interpreted as conflating
the duty and sovereign immunity analyses. The district court’s
opinion should not be interpreted as holding that governmental
tort liability attaches as a matter of law in the absence of a statutory or common law duty if the activity in question is operational
in nature. Such a conclusion would contravene fundamental and
oft-repeated principles of duty and the law of sovereign immunity.
Furthermore, we specifically refuse the petitioners’ invitation to
alter the law of sovereign immunity to provide that if a governmental act is operational in nature, then there automatically exists a duty of care to all persons injured by the act or omission.161

Justices Pariente and Quince dissented from the majority opinion.
The gravamen of the dissent was that FHP gratuitously undertook to
maintain Florida’s highways and assumed the duty to respond to the
stalled tractor-trailer “when the dispatcher assured Mr. Pedrero that
he would ‘send a unit to check it out.’”162 The dissent further concluded that FHP’s ministerial duty of logging the calls into the system was an operational-level activity, not a governmental planning
function, and thus sovereign immunity was subject to the statutory
waiver in this situation.163 Conspicuously absent from the dissent is
any discussion of Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Johnson,164 which
arguably supports Justice Pariente’s position.

158. Id. at 937.
159. Id. at 938.
160. State v. Pollack, 745 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), quashed sub nom. by Pollock v. Fla. Dep’t of Hwy. Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 2004).
161. Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 938 (citation omitted).
162. Id. at 942 (Pariente, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 942-43.
164. 873 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 2003).
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The Clay Electric case involved a tragic accident in the early
morning darkness on September 4, 1997, when a fourteen-year-old
boy was struck and killed by an automobile in an area where a
streetlight was inoperative.165 The issue in the case was whether the
electric company owed the plaintiff a legal duty to use reasonable
care in maintaining the streetlight.166 The court held that the electric
company owed the plaintiff a duty based upon the so-called “undertaker’s doctrine”:
Whenever one undertakes to provide a service to others, whether
one does so gratuitously or by contract, the individual who undertakes to provide the service—i.e., the “undertaker”—thereby assumes a duty to act carefully and to not put others at an undue
risk of harm. [This maxim] applies to both governmental and nongovernmental entities.167

The dissent in Pollock makes the identical argument but fails to
mention Clay Electric. The likely reason for this is that Clay Electric
is clearly distinguishable from Pollock. In Clay Electric, the electric
company provided power to the streetlight in question; they had begun to act gratuitously with respect to the streetlight and thus had
an obligation to continue to maintain it. Conversely, in Pollock, FHP
did not begin acting gratuitously with respect to the stalled tractortrailer. Had FHP begun to act, and the accident occurred, the FHP
potentially could have been found to have assumed a duty of care under the “undertaker’s doctrine” and the zone of risk theory.168 The fact
remains, however, that FHP did not begin to act; therefore, FHP did
not assume a duty of care as to the plaintiffs. Had the dissent mentioned Clay Electric, it would have served only to undermine an already weak argument.
The majority opinion might be viewed as going against an acceptable human reaction, namely to punish FHP for a horrible tragedy.
Yet the fact remains that FHP had no legal duty to the decedents.
Under these facts the Florida Supreme Court was correct to rule in
accordance with settled legal principles.169

165. Id. at 1184.
166. Id. at 1185.
167. Id. at 1186.
168. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
169. The court clearly recognized these competing interests:
We in no way condone FHP’s failure to take prompt action when it was alerted to
the potential danger caused by the stalled tractor-trailer. However, under settled
principles of Florida law, having not responded to the scene to become directly involved in the roadway circumstances, FHP had no legally recognized particular tort
duty which would generate or impose governmental tort liability with regard to responding to the scene, the issuance of warnings of the potential danger, or provision
for the removal of the tractor-trailer under the circumstances presented in this case.
Pollock, 882 So. 2d at 938.
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GOOD SAMARITAN ACT—THE 2004 FLORIDA LEGISLATURE EXTENDS
THE GOOD SAMARITAN ACT TO PROTECT FROM CIVIL LIABILITY
PERSONS PROVIDING EMERGENCY RESPONSE SERVICES IN
CONNECTION WITH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCIES—FLA. STAT.
§ 718.13 (2004).
With the reality of terrorism to deal with, legislatures have been
forced to confront the startling prospect of disaster management. The
aftermath of an emergency can be disorderly and require the help of
undertrained and inexperienced individuals, many of whom are volunteers. The possibility of accidents occurring during an emergency
situation is not insignificant, and the prospect of tort liability is
heightened due to the participation of hastily trained disaster relief
personnel—such potential liability could undermine emergency aid
efforts before the efforts begin. Recognizing the instrumental role individual workers and volunteers play in recovering from an emergency and the undermining effect tort liability could have on such efforts, the 2004 Florida Legislature extended the Good Samaritan
Act170 to protect emergency workers acting in concert with local,
state, and federal relief efforts.171 However, whether the amendment
will have any real effect is an open question.172
A Good Samaritan law protects from civil liability a person who
gives assistance during an emergency.173 Good Samaritan statutes reflect a preference that persons capable of assisting those in need provide aid rather than refrain from acting due to fear of liability—that
is, the overall social good provided by assistance in emergencies outweighs the harm caused by negligent assistance in emergencies, and
therefore assistance should not be discouraged by subjecting the assistor to a civil suit.174 A majority of jurisdictions protect all assistors
while a minority of jurisdictions protect only those trained to provide
medical assistance.175 Those jurisdictions only extending protection to
medical providers in emergency situations do so by not holding them

170. FLA. STAT. § 768.13 (2004).
171. See Act effective May 12, 2004, ch. 2004-45, 2004 Fla. Laws 406 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 768.13(2)(d)).
172. See infra notes 185-87, and accompanying text.
173. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 252 (2001).
174. See id.; see also Justin T. King, Comment, Criminal Law: “Am I My Brother’s
Keeper?” Sherrice’s Law: A Balance of American Notions of Duty and Liberty, 52 OKLA. L.
REV. 613, 622 (1999) (observing that Good Samaritan laws “encourage good deeds”). A
critic of Good Samaritan laws might observe that if society desires to encourage volunteerism, it should not do so at the expense of the negligently injured. That is, if society derives
an overall benefit from increased volunteerism, then society should compensate the victim.
175. Bridget A. Burke, Using Good Samaritan Acts to Provide Access to Health Care for
the Poor: A Modest Proposal, 1 ANNALS HEALTH L. 139, 140 (1992).
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to the usual professional standard;176 rather, medical providers are
subject to a lower standard.177
Prior to the 2004 amendment, Florida was among the jurisdictions
with a Good Samaritan statute directed only to medical providers.
Florida’s act protected three classes of potential defendants: those
who “gratuitously and in good faith render[] emergency care or
treatment” in response to a declared emergency or at the scene of an
emergency outside a doctor’s office or hospital;178 health care providers, including hospitals, supplying emergency services;179 and any
health care practitioner who is in a hospital who attends to a patient
“with whom at that time the practitioner does not have a thenexisting health care patient-practitioner relationship, and when such
care or treatment is necessitated by a sudden or unexpected situation
or by an occurrence that demands immediate medical attention.”180
The 2004 amendment181 to the Good Samaritan Act created another protected class in addition to those supplying medical relief.
This class includes any person participating in “emergency response
activities under the direction of or in connection with . . . local emergency management agencies, [state agencies], or the Federal Emergency Management Agency.”182 This class enjoys broader protection
from civil damages than the other classes—in addition to immunity
from damages as a result of care or treatment, this class is also im-

176. E.g., 1 DOBBS, supra note 173, § 242, at 631-32 (“[T]he patient normally understands and expects that physicians acting within the ambit of their professional work will
exercise the skill, knowledge, and care normally possessed and exercised by other members
of their profession . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
177. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.13(2)(a) (2004) (exempting from liability in an emergency any person, including those licensed to practice medicine, who acts “as an ordinary
reasonably prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances”).
As Professor Dobbs observes, the suits that Good Samaritan statutes protect against are
“practically non-existent,” since the standard of care for a physician acting in an emergency would take into account the unusual circumstances of the emergency. 1 DOBBS, supra note 173, § 252, at 664; see also Thomas Wm. Mayo, Health Care Law, 55 SMU L. REV.
1113, 1121 (2002) (noting that, though most states have a Good Samaritan law, “there are
very few reported opinions under them”). Although Good Samaritan laws have been described as “legislative placebos,” there is still plausibly some value in the placebo effect.
See Burke, supra note 175, at 141 (“Since these laws served to assuage physicians’ fears of
liability, and because they seemed to encourage positive behavior, they were not objectionable.”). However, true to Dobbs’ and Mayo’s criticisms, a Westlaw search reveals just six
reported opinions arising from Florida’s Good Samaritan Act in its nearly forty years of existence.
178. FLA. STAT. § 768.13(2)(a) (2003).
179. Id. § 768.13(2)(b)(1).
180. Id. § 768.13(2)(c)(1).
181. Act effective May 12, 2004, ch. 2004-45, 2004 Fla. Laws 406 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 768.13(2)(d) (2004)).
182. FLA. STAT. § 768.13(2)(d) (2004).
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mune as a result of “services.”183 However, immunity is only extended
if a person acts as a “reasonably prudent person would have acted
under the same or similar circumstances.”184
The addition to the Good Samaritan Act creates at least three
questions for its interpretation and its ultimate effect: (1) the breadth
of the phrase “in connection with” the emergency response actions of
an agency,185 (2) the scope of the word “services,”186 and (3) the actual
effect of the amendment, as it immunizes “reasonably prudent persons” from liability, which is the same standard for a negligence
claim.187 The amendment is plainly directed at increasing volunteerism in the aftermath of a disaster;188 however, considering the possible varying constructions of the phrases “services” and “in connection
with,” it is not clear how much protection the Legislature intended to
provide volunteers. Moreover, the litigation that could define these
terms may be sparse due to the unchanged standard of care.
Taken at face value, the amended Good Samaritan Act seems a
prescient effort by the Legislature in light of the hurricanes that ravaged Florida in 2004 and the accompanying relief efforts. The hurricanes may supply the backdrop for the definition of the amendment’s
ambiguous terms as civil defendants attempt to defend tort suits via
the Good Samaritan Act. On the other hand, the standard of care implemented by the amendment—that of a “reasonably prudent per-

183. Id. Section (2)(a) of the Good Samaritan Act, which extends immunity to persons
not acting in conjunction with an agency, only supplies immunity from civil damages for
those rendering “emergency care or treatment.” Id. § 768.13(2)(a).
184. Id. § 768.13(2)(d).
185. For instance, what level of formality is required to satisfy “in connection with”?
Does the person have to complete paperwork? Contact an agency official or employee? Or
merely assist others in the same general area as an agency’s emergency response effort?
Neither the statute nor the staff report supplies guidance as to the construction of the
phrase.
186. “Services” can also be interpreted broadly. There seems to be little that would not
arguably be a service during a disaster—repairs to property, answering telephones, distributing food, and so on. Again, the statute and the staff report supply little guidance—
the staff report merely acknowledges that immunity for “services” is broader than the immunity provided by the rest of the statute. See Fla. S. Comm. on Comp. Plan. & S. Comm.
on Health, Aging, & Long-Term Care, CS for CS for SB 532 (2004) Staff Analysis 4 (Mar. 8,
2004) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter Comp. Plan. & Health, Aging, & Long-Term Care
Staff Analysis] (stating that the amendment “provides immunity from liability to a person
who provides ‘services’ during emergency response activities, in addition to medical treatment”).
187. See, e.g., De Wald v. Quarnstrom, 60 So. 2d 919, 921 (Fla. 1952) (“Negligence is
the failure . . . to do what a reasonable and prudent person would ordinarily have done under the circumstances . . . .”). This legislation is vulnerable to the same criticism that is
levied at Good Samaritan statutes in general—the protection that is provided to the assistors by statute would also be provided under the usual standard of care. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 173, § 252.
188. See Comp. Plan. & Health, Aging, & Long-Term Care Staff Analysis, supra note
186, at 5 (“The immunity available . . . may encourage people to volunteer to assist government emergency management agencies during emergencies.”).

2005]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

997

son”189—is the same as is required of an ordinary defendant in a tort
suit and provides no additional protection to the Good Samaritan; as
such, defendants who actually use the Good Samaritan defense may
be sparse. If this is the result, it would seem that the Legislature has
created a placebo190—the amendment may provide some comfort to
volunteers and thus encourage their participation, but it is devoid of
effect with regard to their liability for accidents that result from their
participation.
IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL LIABILITY—THE 2004 FLORIDA LEGISLATURE
IMMUNIZES FROM CIVIL LIABILITY MANUFACTURERS AND SELLERS OF
FOOD AND NON-ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND
WRONGFUL DEATH THAT RESULTS FROM LONG-TERM CONSUMPTION OF
SUCH FOOD AND NON-ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES—FLA. STAT. § 768.37
(2004).
From time to time, a tort lawsuit enters the public consciousness
and engenders such debate191 as to force lawmakers to reconsider aspects of the tort system. The central question posed in this discussion
is, To what length should the law go to protect fools?192 In 2003, one
lawsuit garnered such attention from the popular media—Pelman v.
McDonald’s Corp., a New York personal injury class action suit
against McDonald’s, which came about as a result of a child’s illness
associated with long-term consumption of fast food.193 Although the
case was ultimately dismissed,194 the audacity of the suit—
essentially, a suit against a manufacturer of known unhealthy foods
that seeks damages for the predictable result of consuming unhealthy foods—and the potential injury to the food service industry
as a result of such suits has forced political consideration of the topic
in state legislatures.195
189. FLA. STAT. § 768.13(2)(d).
190. See supra note 177.
191. For example, in an infamous products liability suit against McDonald’s, a jury
awarded a $2.9 million verdict to a plaintiff who burned herself when she spilled McDonald’s coffee upon herself. See Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided that a
Coffee Spill Is Worth $2.9 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at A1. The verdict sparked
national headlines and criticism. See id.
192. E.g., Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“If a
person knows or should know that eating copious orders of supersized McDonalds’ products
is unhealthy and may result in weight gain . . . , it is not the place of the law to protect
them from their own excesses.”).
193. 237 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
194. Id. at 543 (dismissing the suit for failing to demonstrate a hidden dangerous condition regarding the food in question and, with respect to the negligence claim, dismissing
for want of duty).
195. Some considered a legislative cure particularly necessary due to the perception
that the fast-food industry would become the next great stomping ground of the plaintiff’s
bar in the wake of successful, widespread tobacco litigation. See Jason L. Riley, Salivating
over Fast-Food Torts, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2003, at A16. On March 10, 2004, the United
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The 2004 Florida Legislature took preemptive action on the issue.196 The Legislature passed House Bill 333,197 aimed squarely at
preventing suits like Pelman.198 In relevant portion, the enacted statute provides:
No manufacturer, distributor, or seller of foods or nonalcoholic
beverages . . . shall be subject to civil liability . . . to the extent
such liability is premised upon a person’s weight gain or obesity . . . resulting from the person’s long-term consumption of such
foods or nonalcoholic beverages.199

Further, the statute defines “long-term” as “the cumulative effect of
multiple instances over a period of time and not the effect of a single
or isolated instance.”200 Finally, the statute provides that it does not
apply where the seller has not provided information regarding nutritional content, as required by Federal law, or where the information
provided is false or misleading.201
Although this statute is clear in purpose and effect, there is nonetheless some question as to whether it was necessary. To date, none
of the suits against the fast-food industry for the long-term effects of
consuming fast food have succeeded;202 moreover, a Florida court had
yet to consider the issue.203 The test for whether a defendant owes the
plaintiff a common law duty in Florida is whether the plaintiff is in
the “foreseeable zone of risk” created by the defendant’s conduct.204
This doctrine, as a general matter, errs on the side of caution in al-

States House of Representatives passed a reform that would prohibit such suits, see Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004); however, to date the Act has not passed the Senate. Additionally, the suit caused the fast food
industry to rethink its practices. McDonald’s, the original target, began offering healthier
menu options. See, e.g., Steven Gray, McDonald’s Feels the Heat and Offers Some Healthier
Fare, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2004, at A11.
196. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, HB 333 (2004) Staff Analysis 2 (Feb. 2, 2004)
(on file with comm.) [hereinafter Judiciary Staff Analysis] (stating that Florida courts have
not addressed the issue).
197. See Act effective May 21, 2004, ch. 2004-88, 2004 Fla. Laws 579 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 768.37 (2004)).
198. See Judiciary Staff Analysis, supra note 196, at 2.
199. FLA. STAT. § 768.37 (2004).
200. Id. The definition of “long-term” is well reasoned, as it prevents a covered entity
from using this statute as a defense in the case of a traditional products liability case,
wherein some condition (aside from the adverse cumulative health effect of consumption)
causes injury to a plaintiff.
201. Id. One of the premises of the holding in Pelman was the everyday knowledge of
the relative healthfulness, or lack thereof, of the food at issue. See Pelman v. McDonald’s
Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“It is well-known that fast food in general,
and McDonalds’ products in particular, contain high levels of cholesterol, fat, salt, and
sugar, and that such attributes are bad for one.”). The Florida statute assumes such
knowledge exists so long as the nutritional information is available and accurate.
202. See Gray, supra note 195.
203. See Judiciary Staff Analysis, supra note 196, at 2.
204. See McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 502-04 (Fla. 1992).
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lowing claims to clear the judicial screening function of duty in order
to ensure potentially worthy claims are heard by the jury.205 As such,
it would appear that a well-pleaded argument, to the effect that a
fast-food consumer was foreseeably placed at risk by the fast-food industry owed to the unhealthy nature of the food produced by the industry, would have survived a motion to dismiss prior to the instant
legislation.206 Due to the potential that a Florida tort claim against a
food manufacturer would reach the jury, the instant legislation is an
effective implementation of the Legislature’s goal.

205. See William N. Drake, Jr., Foreseeable Zone of Risk: Confusing Foreseeability with
Duty in Florida Negligence Law, FLA. B.J., Apr. 2004, at 10, 12 (arguing that, in tort cases
since McCain, the Florida Supreme Court “invariably has found a duty to exist”).
206. A doctrine that is logically useful is diminished duty for a risk-taking plaintiff, or
“comparative negligence.” See 1 DOBBS, supra note 173, §§ 201-02. Under this theory, the
health risk of the plaintiff’s ingestion of fast food is an open and obvious danger, and the
plaintiff is said to have assumed the risk of eating the food. Id. However, this doctrine is an
affirmative defense and therefore forces the defendant to endure trial and persuade the
jury; furthermore, Florida is a pure comparative negligence state. Id. § 202. This means
that a jury could find the defendant partially negligent as compared to the plaintiff’s
fault—say, twenty-five percent to the plaintiff’s seventy-five percent—and still allow the
plaintiff to recover. See id. The legislative civil immunity absolves defendants of the burden and risk of a jury trial.
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